SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
The Grand Jury charges:
1. From at least the early 1990's until in or aboutApril 2002, Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman, a/k/a “the Sheikh,” a/k/a“Sheikh Omar” (hereinafter, “Abdel Rahman”), who is a co-conspiratornot named as a defendant herein, was an influential and high-rankingmember of terrorist organizations based in Egypt and elsewhere.Abdel Rahman considered nations, governments, institutions, andindividuals that did not share his radical interpretation of Islamiclaw to be “infidels” and interpreted the concept of “jihad”(“struggle”) to compel the waging of opposition against such infidelsby whatever means necessary, including force and violence.
2. According to Abdel Rahman's public remarks in 1990, “Jihad… there is no such thing as commerce, industry and science in jihad. This is calling things … other thanby its own names. If God …says do jihad, it means do ‘jihad withthe sword, with the cannon, with the grenades and with the missile’ thisis jihad. Jihad against God's enemies for God's cause and His word."
3. Abdel Rahman supported and advocated jihad to, amongother things: (1) overthrow the Egyptian government and replace it withan Islamic state; (2) destroy the nation of Israel and give the land tothe Palestinians; and (3) oppose those governments, nations,institutions, and individuals, including the United States and itscitizens, whom he perceived as enemies of Islam and supporters of Egyptand Israel.
4. Abdel Rahman endorsed terrorism to accomplish his goals.In a speech he gave prior to May 2, 1994, Abdel Rahman said: “Why do wefear the word ‘terrorist?’ If the terrorist is the person who defendshis right; so we are terrorists. And if the terrorist is the one whostruggles for the sake of God, [then] we are terrorists. We …have been ordered with terrorismbecause we must prepare what power we can to terrorize the enemyof God and yours. The Quran [the Islamic holy book] mentionedthe word ‘to strike terror,’ therefore we don't fear to bedescribed with ‘terrorism’… They may say ‘he is aterrorist, he uses violence, he uses force.’ Let them say that.
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We are ordered to “prepare whatever we can of power to terrorize theenemies of Islam.’”
5. Abdel Rahman exercised leadership while subordinatescarried out the details of specific terrorist operations. Abde1 Rahman,who was viewed by his followers and associates as a religious scholar,provided necessary guidance regarding whether particular terroristactivities were permissible or forbidden under his extremistinterpretation of Islamic law, and at times provided strategic adviceconcerning whether such activities would be an effective means ofachieving their goals. Abdel Rahman also solicited persons to commitviolent terrorist actions. Additionally, Abdel Rahman served as a mediatorof disputes among his followers and associates.
6. On or about July 2, 1993, Abdel Rahman wasarrested in the United States. In October 1995, a jury sittingin the United States District Court for the Southern District ofNew York convicted Abdel Rahman of engaging in a seditiousconspiracy to wage a war of urban terrorism against the UnitedStates, which included the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centerand a plot to bomb New York City landmarks, including the UnitedNations, the FBI building in New York, and the Lincoln andHolland tunnels. The jury also found Abdel Rahman guilty ofsoliciting crimes of violence against the United States militaryand Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. In January 1996, Abdel
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Rahman was sentenced to life imprisonment. On August 16, 1999, AbdelRahman's conviction was upheld by the United States Court of Appealsfor the Second Circuit and; on January 10, 2000, the United StatesSupreme Court refused to hear his case and his conviction thus becamefinal. Since on or about 1997, Abdel Rahman has been incarcerated invarious facilities operated by the United States Bureau of Prisons,including the Federal Medical Center in Rochester, Minnesota.
7. Following his arrest, Abdel Rahman urged his followersto wage jihad to obtain his release from custody. For instance, in amessage to his followers recorded while he was in prison, Abdel Rahmanstated that it was the duty of all Muslims to set free any imprisonedfellow Muslims, and that “[t]he Sheikh is calling on you, morning andevening. Oh Muslims! Oh Muslims! And he finds no respondents. It is aduty upon all the Muslims around the world to come to free the Sheikh,and to rescue him from his jail.” Referring to the United States, Abdel Rahmanimplored, “Muslims everywhere, dismember their nation, tear them apart,ruin their economy, provoke their corporations, destroy their embassies,attack their interests, sink their ships, and shoot down their planes, killthem on land, at sea, and in the air. Kill them wherever you find them.”
8. Both prior to and after his arrest andimprisonment, Abdel Rahman was a spiritual leader of an
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international terrorist group based in Egypt and known as the IslamicGroup, a/k/a “Gama'a al-Islamiyya,” a/k/a “IG,” a/k/a “al-Gama'at,”a/k/a “Islamic Gama'at,” a/k/a “Egyptian al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya”(hereinafter, the “Islamic Group”). Abdel Rahman played a key role indefining and articulating the goals, policies, and tactics of theIslamic Group.
9. According to Abdel Rahman's public remarks in1990, Egyptian youths in the 1970's "established what is calledAl Gama'a al-Islamiyya…, reviving [it] for the sake ofAllah . . . . The Islamic group . . . started simple, few,little, then it spread and now has mosques and has presence inthe governorates of Egypt … [M]any of them were killed forthe cause of God as they had sacrificed their own souls; theycarried out many jihad operations against those tyrants. Themost famous and the most successful operation was fighting theatheist,. the oppressor and the profligate by killing him, AnwarAl-Sadat [the Egyptian president who was assassinated in 1981]… and now, it is hoping for another operation, God willing."
10. Abdel Rahman’s followers, including those associated withthe Islamic Group, shared his views about the reasons for jihad,including the goal of obtaining Abdel Rahman’s release from UnitedStates custody.
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Efforts to Secure Abdel Rahman’s Release
11. After Abdel Rahman’s arrest, a coalition of terrorists,supporters, and followers, including leaders and as.sociates ofthe Islamic Group, al Qaeda, the Egyptian Islamic Jim [sic], and the AbuSayyaf terrorist group in the Philippines threatened and committed actsof terrorism directed at obtaining the release of Abdel Rahman fromprison.
12. On or about July 4, 1993, the defendant, AHMED AHDELSATTAR, a/k/a “Abu Omar,” a/k/a “Dr. Ahmed,” spoke to the media regardingAbdel Rahman’s arrest and stated that “we haven’t decided the time orplace, but our Muslim community will definitely demonstrate its outrageat the arrest of the Sheikh,“ and that, “if anything happens to theSheikh, we will hold the American administration responsible …Something very bad could happen.”
13. On or about January 21, 1996, a statement, issued inthe name of the Islamic Group, responded to the sentence oflife imprisonment imposed on Abdel Rahman by threatening, “All Americaninterests will be legitimate targets for our struggle until the releaseof Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman and his brothers. As the AmericanGovernment has opted for open confrontation with the Islamic movementand the Islamic symbols of struggle, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya swearsby God to its irreversible vow to take an eye for an eye.”
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14. On or about April 21, 1996, an Islamic Group leader,who is a co-conspirator not named as a defendant herein (“CC-1”),stated during an interview that “the question of kidnapping Americansas a ransom for [Abdel Rahman] is in the cards, not ruled out, andunder consideration.”
15. On or about February 12, 1997, a statement issued inthe name of the Islamic Group threatened, “The Islamic Group declares allAmerican interests legitimate targets to its legitimate jihad untilthe release of all prisoners, on top of whom” is Abdel Rahman.
16. On or about May 5, 1997, a statement issued in the name ofthe Islamic Group threatened, “If any harm comes to the [S]heikh … al-Gama al-IsIalamiy[y]a will target … all of thoseAmericans who participated in subjecting his life to danger.” Thestatement also said that “A1-Gamaa al-Islamiyya considers everyAmerican official, starting with the American president to the despicablejailer … partners endangering the Sheikh’s life,” and that theIslamic Group would do “everything in its power” to free Abdel Rahman.This statement by the Islamic Group followed a statement released to themedia on May 2, 1997, by one of Abdel Rahman’s attorneys that “[i]tsounds like the Sheikh’s condition is deteriorating and obviouslycould be life-threatening.”
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17. On or about November 17, 1997, six assassins shot andstabbed a group of tourists visiting an archeological site in Luxor,.Egypt. Fifty-eight foreign tourists were killed along with fourEgyptians, some of whom were police officers. Before making their exit,the terrorists scattered leaflets espousing their support for the IslamicGroup and calling for the release of Abdel Rahman. Also, the torso of onevictim was slit by the terrorists and a leaflet calling for AbdelRahman's release was inserted.
18. On or about November 18, 1997, a statement issued inthe name of the Islamic Group said, "A Gama'a unit tried to takeprisoner the largest number of foreign tourists possible… with the aim of securing the release of the general emir.(commander) of the Gama'a al-Islamiyya, Dr. Abdel-Rahman." Thestatement continued, "But the rash behavior and irresponsibilityof government security forces with regard to tourist and civilianlives led to the high number of fatalities." The statement aIso warned that the Islamic Group “will continue its militaryoperations as long as the regime does not respond to ourdemands.” The statement listed the most important demands as“the establishment of God’s law, cutting relations with theZionist entity (Israel) … and the return of our sheik[h] andemir to his land.”
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19. On or about October 13, 1999, a statement in the name ofIslamic Group leader Rifa'i Ahmad Taha Musa, a/k/a “Abu Yasir”(hereinafter, “Taha”), who is a co-conspirator not named. as a defendantherein, vowed to rescue Abdel Rahman and said that the United States’“hostile strategy to the Islamic movemehtn would drive it to "unify itsefforts to confront America’s piracy.”
20. In or about March 2000, individuals claimingassociation with the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group kidnappedapproximately 29 hostages in the Philippines, demanded therelease from prison of Abdel Rahman and two other convictedterrorists in exchange for the release of those hostages, andthreatened to behead hostages if their demands were not met.Philippine authorities later found two decomposed, beheaded bodiesin an area where the hostages had been held, and four hostageswere ‘unaccounted for.’
21. On or about September 21, 2000, an Arabic televisionstation, Al Jazeera, televised a meeting of Usama Bin Laden (leader ofthe al Qaeda terrorist organization), Ayman al Zawahiri (former leader ofthe Egyptian Islamic Jiha organization and one of Bin Laden's toplieutenants), and Taha. Sitting under a banner which read, "Convention toSupport Honorable Omar Abdel Rahman," the three terrorist leaders pledged"mad to free Abdel Rahman from incarceration in the United
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States. During the meeting, Mohammed Abdel Rahman, a/k/a"Asadallah," who is a son of Abdel Rahman, was heard encouragingothers to "avenge your Sheikh" and "go to the spilling of blood."
Other Relevant Events
22. At various times starting in or about July 1997,certain Islamic Group leaders and factions called for an “initiative”(or cease-fire,) in which the Islamic Group would suspend terroristoperations in Egypt in a tactical effort to persuade the Egyptiangovernment to release Islamic Group leaders, members, and associateswho were in prison in Egypt.
23. In or about February 1998, Usama Bin Laden andTaha, among others, issued a fatw (a legal ruling issued by anIslamic scholar) that stated, among other things, “We, in thename of God, call on every Muslim who believes in God and desiresto be rewarded, to follow God's order to kill Americans andplunder their wealth wherever and whenever they find it.”
24. On or about October 12, 2000, in Aden Harbor, Yemen, twoterrorists piloted a bomb-laden boat alongside the United States Navyvessel the U.S.S. Cole and detonated a bomb that ripped a hole in theside of the U.S.S. Cole approximately 40 feet in diameter, murderingseventeen crew members, and wounding at least forty other crew members.
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The Special Administrative Measures zmnosed on Abdel Rahman
25. Beginning in or about April 1997, United Statesauthorities, in order to protect the national security, limited certainof Ab.del Rahman's privileges in prison, including his access to themail, the media, the telephone, and visitors. At that time, the Bureauof Prisons (at the direction of the Attorney General) imposed SpecialAdministrative Measures (“SAMs”) upon Abdel Rahman, pursuant to afederal_regulation (28 C.F.R. § 501.3). The stated purpose of the SAMswas to protect “persons against the risk of death or serious bodilyinjury” that could result if Abdel Rahman were free “to communicate(send or receive) terrorist information.” Under the SAMs, Abdel Rahmancould only call his wife or his attorneys and their translator, couldonly be visited by his immediate family members or his attorneys andtheir translator, and could only receive mail after it was screened byfederal authorities. In addition, the SAMs prohibited communication withany member or representative news media. More specifically, as of April7, 1999, the SAMs provided that “[t]he inmate will not be permitted totalk with, meet with, correspond with, or otherwise communicate with anymember, or representative, of the news media, in person, by telephone,by furnishing a recorded message, through the mails, through hisattorney(s), or otherwise.”
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26. The SAMS specifically provided that attorneys for AbdelRahman were obliged to sign an affirmation, acknowledging that they andtheir staff would abide fully by the SAMs, before being allowed access toAbdel Rahman. The attorneys agreed in these affirmations, among otherthings, to "only be accompanied by translators for the purpose ofcommunicating with inmate Abdel Rahman concerning legal matters."Moreover, since at least in or about May 1998, the attorneys also agreednot to "use [their] meetings, correspondence, or phone calls with AbdelRahman to pass messages between third parties (including, but not limitedto, the media) and Abdel Rahman."
27. Defendant AHMED ABDEL SATTAR, a/k/a "Abu Omar," a/k/a"Dr. Ahmed," is a longtime associate of and surrogate for Abdel Rahman.SATTAR negotiated Abdel Rahman's surrender and was present at AbdelRahman's arrest on July 2, 1993. Upon Abdel Rahman's arrest, andcontinuing through his conviction, sentencing, and the imposition of theSAMS, SATTAR coordinated efforts to keep Abdel Rahman in contact with hisco-conspirators' and followers. Defendant LYNNE STEWART was one of AbdelRahman's attorneys during his 1995 criminal trial in New York and,following his conviction, continued to act as one of his attorneys.Notwithstanding the SAMS and her agreement to abide by their provisions,STEWART, through her continued access to
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Abdel Rahman, enabled him to remain in contact with his coconspirators and followers. Defendant MOHAMMED YOUSRY testifiedas a defense witness at Abdel Rahman's 1995 criminal trial and,starting in or about 1997, acted as an Arabic interpreter forcommunications between Abdel Rahman and his attorneys.Notwithstanding the SAMs and YOUSRY's knowledge of theirprovisions, YOUSRY, through his continued access to Abdel Rahlnanand facilitated by STEWART, enabled Abdel Rahman.to remain incontact with his co-conspirators and followers.
The Grand Jury further charges:
28. The allegations in Paragraphs 1 through 27 of thisindictment are realleged and incorporated by,reference as though fullyset forth herein.
29. From in or about June 1997 through in or about April2002, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, AHMED ASDELSATTAR, a/k/a "Abu Omar," a/k/a "Dr. Ahmed," LYNNE STEWART, and MOHAMMEDYOUSRY, the defendants, Abdel Rahman, and Taha, together with othersknown and unknown, unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly combined,conspired, confederated, arid agreed together and with each other todefraud the United States and an agency thereof, to wit, to hamper,hinder, impede, and obstruct by trickery, deceit, and dishonest means,the lawful and
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legitimate functions of the United States Department of Justice and itsagency, the Bureau of Prisons, in the administration and enforcement ofthe Special Administrative Measures for inmate Abdel Rahman.
30. In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to effect theillegal object thereof, the following overt acts,. among others, werecommitted in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere:
The March 1999 Prison Visit and Abdel Rahman's March 1999 MessageRegarrding The Islamic Group’s initiative:b. On or about March 1 and 2, 7.999, STEWART andYOUSRY visited Abdel Rahman in prison.
c. On or about March 9, 1999, following the prison visitto Abdel Rahman by STEWART and YOUSRY, SATTAR disseminated to CC-1, anIslamic Group leader, a statement issued by Abdel
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Rahman and directed to Islamic Group leader Taha. In thatstatement, Abdel Rahman instructed Taha to adhere to the initiativeand directed, "No new charter, and nothing should happen or bedone. without consulting me, or informing me."
Abdel Rahman’s March 1999 Message Regarding the Formation of aPolitical Partyd. Abdel Rahman's SeptemberOn or about March Abdel Rahman's September9, 1999, following the prison visitto Abdel Rahman by STEWART and YOUSRY, SATTAR disseminated fo CC-1, anIslamic Group leader, a statement issued by Abdel Rahman and directed toIslamic Group members. In that. statement, Abdel Rahman rejected aproposal that the Islamic Group form a political party in Egypt.
Abdel Rahman's September 1999 Statement Calling for an End tothe Initiativee. On or about September 20, 1999, following a prison visitto Abdel Rahman by YOUSRY and another of Abdel Rahman's attorneys, SATTARtold Taha that Abdel Rahman had issued a statement from jail calling foran end to the initiative in response to reports that a raid in Egypt,by Egyptian law enforcement on or about September 7, 1999, resulted infour Islamic Group members being killed. SATTAR told Taha that AbdelRahman stated, “The Islamic Group has committed itself to thesuspension of military-operations Initiative which was launched two yearsago by the Brothers from their jails, in spite of the Egyptiangovernment’s continued killing of the innocent people
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and conducting unjust military trials.- SATTAR further stated thatAbdel Rahman “demand[ed] that [his] brothers, the sons of the IslamicGroup, do a comprehensive review of the Initiative and its results.[He] also demand[edl that they consider themselves absolved from it.”f. On or about September 20, 1999, during a telephoneconversation with Taha, SATTAR stated that the initiative should becanceled it necessary to accomplish the Islamic Group's goals.
g. On or about November 14, 1999, during a telephoneconversation with another individual, SATTAR stated that the initiativewas not working because it had not succeeded in obtaining the release ofIslamic Group leaders from prison.
The February 2000 Attempte Deliveryof a Message to Abdel Rahmanh. In or about February 2000, with the assistance ofSATTAR, YOUSRY, and others known and unknown, Taha attempted tohave a message regarding Islamic Group activities conveyed toAbdel Rahman during a prison visit to Abdel Rahman by one o hisattorneys and YOUSRY, but the message was not delivered due toAbdel Rahman’s apparent distrust of that attorney.
Stewart's May 16, 2000 Signing of an Agreement to Abide by theTerms of the Special Administrative Measuresi. On or about May 16, 2000, STEWART signed an affirmationin which she agreed “to abide by [the] terms” of the SAMs then in effecton Abdel Rahman. In particular, STEWART agreed that she would “only beaccompanied by translators for the
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purpose of communicating with inmate Abdel Rahman concerning legalmatters" and that she would not "use [her] meetings, correspondence, orphone calls with Abdel Rahman to pass messages between third parties(including, but not limited to, the media) and Abdel Rahman.”
The May 2000 Prison Visitj. On or about May 19, 2000, during a prison visit to AbdelRahman by STEWART and YOUSRY, YOUSRY told Abdel Rahman and. STEWART aboutthe kidnappings by the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group in the Philippines andAbu Sayyaf’s demand to free Abdel Rahman, to which STEWART replied, “Goodfor them.” STEWART then told Abdel Rahman that she believed he could bereleased from prison if the government in Egypt were changed. STEWARTalso told Abdel Rahman that events like the Abu Sayyaf kidnappings in thePhilippines are important, although they “may be futile,” because it is“very, very crucial” that Abdel Rahman not be forgotten as a hero of the“Muiahadeen” (Jihad warriors).
k. On or about May 19, 2000, during a prison visit to AbdelRahman by STEWART and YOUSRY, YOUSRY read Abdel Rahman an inflammatorystatement by Taha that had recently been published in an Egyptiannewspaper.
l. On or about May 19, 2000, during a prison visit to AbdelRahman by STEWART and YOUSRY, YOUSRY, at STEWART's urging, read AbdelRahman a letter from SATTAR. Among other things,
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SATTAR’s letter informed Abdel Rahman that SATTAR’s communications withspecified Islamic Group leaders had become “semi-constant” over.the pastyear, arid asked Abdel Rahman, “If there is anything, please notify.” Inaddition, SATTAR's letter asked Abdel Rahman to endorse “the formationof a team that calls for cancellation of the peace initiative or makesthreats escalates things.”m. On or about May 19, 2000, during a prison visit to AbdelRahman by STEWART and YOUSRY, while YOUSRY read Taha's statement andSATTAR's letter to Abdel Rahman, STEWART actively concealed that factfrom the prison guards. At one point, STEWART and YOUSRY explicitlydiscussed the fact that the guards were patrolling close to the prisonconference room and might notice that STEWART was not involved in theconversation between YOUSRY and Abdel Rahman. To conceal the fact thatSTEWART was not participating in the meeting, among other things, STEWARTinstructed YOUSRY to make it look as if STEWART were communicating withAbdel Rahman and YOUSRY were merely translating, by having YOUSRY lookperiodically at STEWART and Abdel Rahman in turn, even though YOUSRY wasin fact reading. STEWART also pretended to be participating in theconversation with Abdel Rahman by making extraneous comments such as“chocolate” and “heart attack.” STEWART contemporaneously observed toYOUSRY that she could “get an award for” her acts of
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concealment, and YOUSRY agreed that STEWART should “get an award inacting.” Following the comments about STEWART's acting ability,STEWART, YOUSRY, and Abdel Rahman all laughed.n. On or about. May 19, 2000, during a prison visit toAbdel Rahman by STEWART and YOUSRY, while YOUSRY read SATTAR’s letter toAbdel Rahman, STEWART and YOUSRY laughed while . acknowledging that ifthe prison guards discovered that they, were reading Abdel Rahman aletter from SATTAR they would get “in trouble.”
o. On or about May 20, 2000, during the second day of aprison visit to Abdel Rahman by STEWART and YOUSRY, Abdel Rahman dictatedletters to YOUSRY indicating that he did not support the cease-fire andcalling for the Islamic Group, to reevaluate the cease-fire, whileSTEWART again actively concealed the conversation between YOUSRY andAbdel Rahman from the prison guards. Among other things, STEWARTperiodically interrupted the dictation with extraneous comments, andstated explicitly that she would do so from time to time in order to keepthe guards from realizing that she was not participating in theconversation.
p. In or about late May 2000, after STEWART andYOUSRY's visit to AbdSteStewart's M&y 26. 2000 Submission of Her Agreementthe Terms of the pecial Administrative Measureswart's M&y 26. 2000 Submission of Her Agreementthe Terms of the pecial Administrative MeasureseStewart's M&y 26. 2000 Submission of Her Agreementthe Terms of the pecial Administrative Measuresl Rahman on May 19 and 20, 2000, SATTAR hadtelephone conversations with Islamic Group leaders in which hestated that Abdel Rahman: (1) did not object to a return to
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“work” (terrorist operations); (2) agreed that the Islamic Groupshould escalate the issues in the media; (3) advised the Islamic Groupto avoid division in the Islamic Group's leadership; and (4) instructedthe Islamic Group to hint at a military operation even if the IslamicGroup was not ready for military action.
Stewart’s May 26. 2000 Submission of Her Agreement to Abide bythe Terms of the Special Administrative Measuresq. On or about May 26, 2000, STEWART submitted to the UnitedStates Attorney’s Oftice for the Southern District of New York theaffirmation that she signed on May 16, 2000, in which she agreed to abideby the terms of the SAMs then in effect on Abdel Rahman.
The June 2000 Press Release Regarding Abdel Rahman’s Withdrawal ofSupport for the Initiativer. On or about June 14, 2000, STEWART released a statementto the press that quoted Abdel Rahman as stating that he “is withdrawinghis support for the cease-fire that currently exists.”
s. On or about June 15, 2000, during a telephoneconversation with'another person, STEWART stated her concern that shewould not be able to “hide” from the United States Attorney’s office thefact that she had issued the press release.
Abdel Rahman’s Second June 2000 Statement Regarding theInitiativet. On or about June 19, 2000, SATTAR spoke by telephonewith CC-1, an Islamic Group leader, regarding Abdel
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Rahman’s withdrawal of support for the initiative and the confusionthe statement supposedly caused within the Islamic Group.u. On or about June 19, 2000, one of Abdel Rahman’s sons,Mohammed Abdel Rahman, spoke by telephone with SATTAR and asked SATTARto convey to Abdel Rahman the fierceness of the debate within theIslamic Group about the initiative, and said that “even if the otherside is right,” SATTAR should tell Abdel Rahman to calm the situation bysupporting “the general line of the Group.”
v. On or about June 20, 2000, SATTAR spoke bytelephone with Mohammed Abdel Rahman and advised him that aconference call had taken place that morning between Abdel Pahmanand some of his attorneys and that Abdel Rahman had issued a newstatement containing additional points which made clear, amongother things, that Abdel Rahman was not unilaterally ending theinitiative, but rather, was withdrawing his support for it and“stating that it was up” to the “brothers” in the Islamic Group nowto reconsider the issue.
The October 2000 Fatwahw. On or about October 3, 2000, Taha called SATTAR anddiscussed a fatwah Taha had written under Abdel Rahman’s name in responseto recent events in the Middle East, to which SATTAR had made revisions.
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x. On or about October 4, 2000, SATTAR called YassirA1-Sirri, a co-conspirator not named as a defendant herein, and readto him a fatwa to be issued under Abdel Rahman’s name entitled, “FatwahMandating the Killing of Israelis Everywhere,” which A1-Sirri agreed torevise and disseminate.
y. On or about October 5, 2000, the fatwa appeared on theweb-site operated by A1-Sirri. The fatwah called on “brother scholarseverywhere in the Muslim world to do their part and issue a unanimousatwah that urges the Muslim nation to fight the Jews, and to kill themwherever they are.” The fatwah further urged “the Muslim nation” to“fight the Jews by all possible means of Jihad, either by killing them asindividuals or by targeting their interests, and the interests of thosewho support them, as much as they can.”
z. On or about October 11, 2000, during a telephoneconversation, YOUSRY told STEWART that Abdel Rahman did not want hisattorneys to deny that he had issued the fatwah urging the killing ofJews around the world and the targeting of the interests of those whosupport them.
aa. On or about October 11, 2000, during a telephoneconversation, STEWART told YOUSRY that she could not deny that she hadissued the press release in June 2000, and that her position was thatAbdel Rahman “is going to get his message out no matter what.”
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bb. On or about October 20, 2000, during an attorneytelephone call to Abdel Rahman, YOUSRY was told by Abdel Rahman that hedid not personally issue the fatwah, but did not want anyone to deny hehad made it because “it is good.”
The Bombing of the U.S.S. Cole and the Conspiracv to Threaten SimilarActs Unless Abdel Rahman is Freedcc. On or about October 2S, 2000, SATTAR spoke bytelephone to Taha, and Taha told SATTAR that “an Egyptian male” wasinvolved in the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole and that SATTAR shouldassist in delivering a message to the United States governmentsuggesting that similar attacks would occur unless Abdel Rahman werefreed from prison.
Stewart’s May 7. 2001 Signing and,Submission of an Agreement toAbide by the Terms of the Special Administrative Measuresdd. On or about May 7, 2001, STEWART signed and faxed to theUnited States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York anaffirmation in which she agreed “to abide by [the] terms” of the SAMsthen in effect on Abdel Rahman: in particular, STEWART agreed that,during any visits to Abdel Rahman, she would “only be accompanied bytranslators for the purpose of communicating with inmate Abdel Rahmanconcerning legal matters,” that she would only allow such meetings “to beused for legal discussion between Abdel Rahman and [her],” and that shewould not “use [her] meetings, correspondence, or phone
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calls with Abdel Rahman to pass messages between third parties(including, but not limited to, the media) and Abdel Rahman."
The July 2001 Prison Visit and the Conspiracy to Threaten ActsSimilar to the Bombing of the U.S.S. Cole Unless Abdel Rahman isFreedee. On or about July 13, 2001, during a prison visit to AbdelRahman in Minnesota by STEWART and YOUSRY, YOUSRY told Abdel Rahman thatSATTAR had been informed that the U.S.S. Cole was bombed on AbdelRahman’s behalf and that SATTAR was asked to convey to the United Statesgovernment that more terrorist acts would follow if the United Statesgovernment did not free Abdel Rahman. While YOUSRY was informing AbdelRahman about this scheme, STEWART actively concealed the conversationbetween YOUSRY and Abdel Rahman from the prison guards by, among otherthings, shaking a water jar and tapping on the table while stating thatshe was “just doing covering noise.”
ff. On or about July 14, 2001, during the second dayof a prison visit to Abdel Rahman in Minnesota by STEWART and YOUSRY, YOUSRY read Abdel Rahman letters and Abdel Rahmandictated responsive letters to YOUSRY.
Dissemination of a False Claim Regarding Abdel Rahman’s PrisonConditionsgg. On or about January 8, 2001, SATTAR spoke by telephonewith STEWART. During this call, SATTAR informed STEWART that the prisonadministrator where Abdel Rahman was incarcerated had pleaded withAbdel Rahman's wife to tell Abdel
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Rahman to take insulin for his diabetes. Although SATTAR and STEWARTknew that Abdel Rahman was voluntarily refusing to take insulin for hisdiabetes, they agreed that SATTAR should issue a public statementfalsely claiming that the Bureau of Prisons was denying medicaltreatment to Abdel Rahman. STEWART expressed the opinion that thismisrepresentation was “safe” because no one on the “outside” would knowthe truth.hh. On or about January 8, 2001, SATTAR spoke by telephonewith A1-Sirri and together they wrote a statement regarding AbdelRahman’s prison conditions, which included, among other things, a falseclaim that Abdel Rahman was.being denied insulin by the United Statesgovernment. A1-Sirri instructed SATTAR to send the statement to Reutersand any other news agencies he could contact.
ii. Between on or about January 8, 2001, and on or aboutJanuary 10, 2001, SATTAR and Al-Sirri disseminated to several newsorganizations and on a website the false claim that United Statesauthorities were withholding insulin from Abdel Rahman.
(Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.)
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(Conspiracy to Kill and Kidnap Persons in a Foreign Country)
The Grand Jury further charges:
31. The allegations in Paragraphs 1 through 27 and 30(a)through 30(ii) of this Indictment are realleged and incorporated byreference as though fully set forth herein.
32. From in or about September 1999 through in or aboutApril 2002, within the jurisdiction of the United States, in the SouthernDistrict of New York and elsewhere, AHMED AHDEL SATTAR, a/k/a “Abu Omar,”a/k/a “Dr. Ahmed,” the defendant, Abdel Rahman, and Taha, together withothers known and unknown, unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly combined,conspired, confederated, and agreed together and with each other tomurder and kidnap persons in a foreign country.
33. In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to effect theillegal object thereof, the following overt acts, among others, werecommitted in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere:
(Soliciation of Crimes of Violence)
The Grand Jury further charges:
34. The allegations in Paragraphs 1 through 27, 30(a)through 30(ii), and 33 (b) through 33 (h) of this Indictment arerealleged and incorporated by reference a9 though fully set forth herein.
35. From in or about September 1999 through in or1about April 2002, in the Southern District of New York andelsewhere, AHMED ABDEL SATTAR, a/k/a "Abu Omar," a/k/a"Dr. Ahmed," the defendant, and others known and unknown, withthe intent that other persons engage in conduct constituting afelony that has as an element the use, attempted use, andthreatened use of physical force against property or against theperson of another in violation of the laws of the United States,and under circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent,solicited, commanded, induced, and otherwise endeavored topersuade such other persons to engage in such conduct, to wit,AHMED AHDEL SATTAR solicited, commanded, induced, and otherwiseendeavored to persuade other persons to engage in violentterrorist operations worldwide to achieve the Islamic Group'sobjectives, in violation of Title 18,'United states Code,Sections 956, 2332, and 2332b.
(Title 18, United States Code, Section 373)
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(Conspiracy to Provide and Conceal
The Grand Jury further charges:
36. The allegations in Paragraphs 1 through 27, 30(a) through 30 (ii) and 33.(b) through 33 (h) of this indictment arerealleged and incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein.
37. From in or about September 1999 through in or aboutApril 2002, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, LYNNESTEWART and MOHAMMED YOUSRY, the defendants, together with othersknown and unknown, unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly combined,conspired, confederated, and agreedtogether and with each other to violate Section 2339A of Title 18, United States Code.
38. It was a part and an object of said conspiracy thatLYNNE STEWART and MOHAMMED YOUSRY, the defendants, and others known andunknown, within the United States, would and did provide material supportand resources, to wit, would and did provide personnel by making AbdelRahman available as a coconspirator, and would and did conceal anddisguise the nature, location, source, and ownership of material supportand resources, to wit, would and did conceal and disguise the nature,location, source, and ownership of personnel by concealing and disguisingthat Abdel Rahman was a co-conspirator, knowing and
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intending that such material support and resources were to be usedin preparation for, and in carrying out, a violation of Section 956of Title 18, United States Code, to wit, the conspiracy charged inCount Two of this Indictment, and in preparation for, and in carrying out, the concealment of such violation.
39. In furtherance of the material-support conspiracy, andto effect the illegal object thereof, the following overt acts, amongothers, were committed in the Southern District~of New York andelsewhere:
(Title 18, United States Code, Section 371).
(Providing and Concealing
The Grand Jury further charges:
40. The allegations in Paragraphs I through 27, 30(a),through 30(ii), and 33 (b) through 33(h) of this indictment are reallegedand incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein.
41. From in or about September 1999 through in or aboutApril 2002, in the Southern District of New York and
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elsewhere, LYNNE STEWART and. MOHAMMED YOUSRY, the defendants, togetherwith others known and unknown, within the United States, providedmaterial support and resources, to wit, provided personnel by makingAbdel Rahman available as a co-conspirator, and concealed and disguisedthe nature, location, source, and ownership of material support andresources, to wit, concealed and disguised the nature, location, source,and ownership of personnel by concealing and disguising that AbdelRahman was a co-conspirator, knowing and intending that such materialsupport and resources were to be used in preparation for, and incarrying out, a violation of Section 956 of Title 18, United States Code,to wit, the conspiracy charged in Count Two of this Indictment, and inpreparation for, and in carrying out, the concealment of such violation.
The Grand Jury further charges:
42. The allegations in Paragraphs 1 through 27, 30 (a)through 30 (ii), and 33 (b) through 33 (h) of this Indictment arerealleged and incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein.
43. in or about May 2000, in the Southern District of NewYork and elsewhere, LYNNE STEWART, the defendant, in a matter
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within the jurisdiction of the executive branch of government, to wit,the United States Department of Justice and its agency, the Bureau ofPrisons, unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly made materially false,fictitious, and fraudulent statements and representations, and made andused a false writing and document knowing the same to contain materiallyfalse., fictitious, and fraudulent statements and entries, to wit,STEWART submitted an affirmation to, the United States Attorney's Officefor the Southern District of New York falsely stating, among otherthings, the following: (1) that STEWART "agree [s] to-abide by [the] terms"of the Special Administrative Measures applicable to Abdel Rahman; (2)that STEWART "shall only be accompanied by translators for the purpose ofcommunicating with inmate Abdel Rahman concerning legal matters"; and (3)that STEWART shall not "use [her] meetings, correspondence, or phonecalls with Abdel Rahman to pass-messages between third parties(including, but not limited to, the media) and Abdel Rahman:"
(Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001.)
44. The allegations in Paragraphs 1 through 27, 30 (a) through 30(ii), and 33 (b) through 33 (h) of this Indictment are
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realleged and incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein.
45. In or about May 2001; in the Southern District of NewYork and elsewhere, LYNNE STEWART, the defendant, in a matter within thejurisdiction of the executive branch of government, to wit, the UnitedStates Department of Justice and its agency, the Bureau of Prisons,unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly made materially false, fictitious, andfraudulent statements and representations, and made and used a falsewriting and document knowing the same to contain materially false,fictitious, and fraudulent statements and entries, to wit, STEWARTsubmitted an affirmation to the United States Attorney’s Office for theSouthern District of New York falsely stating, among other things, thefollowing: (1) that STEWART.`agree[s] to abide by [the] terms" of thespecial Administrative Measures applicable to Abdel Rahman; (2) thatSTEWART “shall only be accompanied by translators for the purpose ofcommunicating with inmate Abdef Rahman concerning legal matters”; (3)that STEWART “will only allow the meetings to be used for legaldiscussion between Abdel Rahman and [her]”; and (4) that STEWART shallnot “use [her] meetings, correspondence, or phone calls with Abdel Rahmanto
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pass messages between third parties (including, but not limitedto the media) and Abdel Rahman.
(Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001.)
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Sources: U.S. District Court, U.S. Attorney, LynneStewart.org