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You Make the Call... is a publication of the National Sports Law Institute of Marquette University Law School.

Winter 2000
Volume 2, Issue 3
Cureton v. NCAA
Stanley v. University of Southern California
Hayden v. University of Notre Dame
Charpentier v. Los Angeles Rams Football Co. Inc.
Johnny Blastoff Inc. v. Los Angeles Rams Football Co.
Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Association
Davis v. Monroe Board of Education
Washington v. IHSAA

Stanley v. University of Southern California, 178 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir., June 2, 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 533 (November 29, 1999)

FEMALE COACHES SUIT ALLEGING SEX DISCRIMINATION AND VIOLATIONS OF EQUAL PAY ACT ENDS

Marianne Stanley sued the University of Southern California (USC) for sex discrimination and retaliatory discharge in connection with a contract dispute over her salary as head women's basketball coach. Stanley alleged that her salary was not comparable to that of head men's basketball coach George Raveling and that she was discriminated against and discharged from her coaching position because of her complaint about this unequal pay. After various decisions in the case beginning in 1993, the dispute made its way to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Ninth Circuit initially reviewed Stanley's Equal Pay Act claim. As the court explained, Stanley has the burden of establishing a prima facia case by showing that employees of the opposite sex are paid lower wages for equal work. To prevail she had to show that the jobs of head women's and men's basketball coach are "substantially equal." An analysis of whether the jobs are "substantially equal" focuses on (1) whether the jobs have a common core and are significantly identical, and (2) whether any additional tasks make one of the jobs substantially different.

While Stanley argued that her job was substantially equal to Raveling's, the university argued that there are significant differences because the men's coach bears greater revenue generating responsibility, is under greater media and spectator pressure, and generates more revenue for the school. A defendant may rebut a prima facie case by showing that the disparity in pay is based on some factor other than sex. The university demonstrated that Raveling has a markedly greater experience level and much better coaching qualifications than Stanley does. Nevertheless, Stanley could prevail by showing that the university's proffered explanation is actually a pretext for discrimination. However, Stanley's unsupported allegations that there were no differences in her qualifications or experience, did not meet this minimal burden. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decisions granting the university's motion for summary judgment on the Equal Pay Act claim.

Because of this finding that Stanley did not show any discriminatory conduct on the part of the university, her claims under the Fair Employment Housing Act, Title IX, and the California Constitution also failed.

As to her retaliation claim, Stanley alleged that the university retaliated against her because she insisted that USC honor its initial contract offer for a salary level equal to Raveling's, and would not accept a future offer at a lower level. However, the court found that USC's offer of a multi-year contract remained open and the university did not discharge her in response to any protected activity. In fact, her contract had expired and she was unable to renegotiate a new contract.

Stanley also asserted that there was an express contract formed with USC based on an alleged initial offer of a contract at a salary level equal to Raveling. However, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the lower courts that there was no evidence that there was a meeting of the minds regarding any such alleged offer and therefore, that no contract was formed.

Stanley then argued that an implied-in-fact employment contract existed under which USC led her to believe that she would be rewarded with a multi-year contract with equal pay for equal work if she produced a successful basketball program. The court found no evidence that her express written contract was modified in this way.

Stanley also asserted that USC violated an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it failed to pay her a salary equal to Raveling's. The court held that such a claim requires proof of a valid contract, but that Stanley has no such contract upon which to base her claim.

For the foregoing reasons, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of USC. (Stanley's petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court was subsequently denied in Stanley v. USC, 120 S.Ct. 533, November 29, 1999).

WEBFIND at http://laws.findlaw.com/9th/9555466.html

 

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"You Make The Call..." is a newsletter published four times per year (spring, summer, fall, winter) by the National Sports Law Institute of Marquette University Law School, PO Box 1881, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 53201-1881. (414) 288-5815, fax (414) 288-5818, munsli@vms.csd.mu.edu. (www.marquette.edu/law/sports/call.html). This publication is distributed via fax and email to individuals in the sports field upon request.
Editorial Staff:
Paul M. Anderson, Editor & Designer
Kirsten Hauser, Associate Editor

 

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