Michael Bowers is a learning disabled student-athlete who was forced to
enroll in special education courses to meet high school requirements. As a result of the
courses he took, and miscommunication in the information provided to the NCAA, Bowers was
declared as a nonqualifier by the NCAA, meaning that he was ineligible to participate in
athletics or to receive financial aid during his freshman year in college.
Bowers subsequently sued the NCAA asking for a preliminary injunction
from the New Jersey District Court to force the NCAA to grant him the status necessary to
participate in athletics and receive an athletic scholarship. In addressing his complaint,
the Court first asked the NCAA to consider a waiver of the eligibility rules for Bowers
but such a waiver was denied.
In following much of the same reasoning as other courts which have
considered this issue (i.e. Ganden), the district court herein determined that what
Bowers was really asking for was a "virtual elimination of the 'core
course' requirement, rather than a mere 'modification' or
'accommodation' required by the ADA, which the NCAA already provides,"
through its waiver process.(p.466) As the court discussed, "the ADA 'does not
require the NCAA to simply abandon its eligibility requirements, but only to make
reasonable modifications to them." (p.466) The Court then followed the ruling in Ganden
"finding that a complete abandonment of the "core course" requirement would
fundamentally alter the nature of the privilege of participation in the NCAA's
intercollegiate athletic program."(p.467) Therefore, the Court also followed Ganden
and denied Bowers motion for a preliminary injunction.
The Bowers case returned to the district court in June of 1998.
The second Bowers case dealt with the NCAA's motion to dismiss Bowers'
First Amended Complaint. Despite Bowers mistaken allegation that Title II of the ADA
applied to the NCAA, in a groundbreaking decision the court initially noted that Title III
applies to the NCAA. Specifically the court stated that "Bowers has adequately
alleged that the NCAA owns, leases (or leases to), or operates the place of public
accommodation and that he was denied the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of that place of public
accommodation."(p. * 56).
As to the NCAA being an "operator" of a "place of public
accommodation," after reviewing a significant amount of case law, the court stated
that the issue boils down to whether the NCAA "manages, controls, or regulates the
place of public accommodation" in such a way that it denied Bowers enjoyment of the
accommodation in a discriminatory fashion. (p. *80). The court found that Bowers had
provided significant facts to demonstrate the NCAA's "operation" under this
test because, the NCAA's enforcement power caused him to be declared ineligible and
therefore, to be denied access to intercollegiate athletics; the NCAA establishes these
standards which caused his ineligibility, as a result he could not participate in practice
or games, or receive scholarship money; and the NCAA leases and operates facilities which
are places of public accommodation. Therefore, the NCAA's motion for summary judgment
asking the court to determine that it was not an "operator" as defined under
Title III was denied.
Finally, as to the NCAA's motion to dismiss the claim that it
discriminates against the learning disabled through its eligibility rules, the court found
that the NCAA's waiver process and other accommodations still might not be enough to
avoid a claim of discrimination. In his Amended Complaint, Bowers no longer sought a
complete change in the NCAA "core course" requirements, instead he restricted
his claim to a modification more closely tied to his particular situation. The court found
it inappropriate to determine the merits of this amended claim at the motion stage.
As a result, the case was allowed to proceed toward trial on the merits
of these issues.
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You Make the Call. . . Index
"You Make The Call..." is a newsletter published four times per year (spring,
summer, fall, winter) by the National Sports Law Institute of Marquette University Law
School, PO Box 1881, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 53201-1881. (414) 288-5815, fax (414) 288-5818,
munsli@vms.csd.mu.edu. (www.marquette.edu/law/sports/call.html).
This publication is distributed via fax and email to individuals in the sports field upon
request.
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Editorial Staff:
Paul M. Anderson, Editor & Designer
Kirsten Hauser, Associate Editor
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Copyright © 1999 -- All rights reserved.