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You Make the Call... is a publication of the National Sports Law Institute of Marquette University Law School.

Winter 1998-99
Volume 1, Issue 3
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith
Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n
Bingham v. Oregon School Activities Association
Willis v. Anderson Community Sch. & Walton-Floyd v. U.S. Olympic Comm.

Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 1999 WL 118667 (E.D. Pa 1999).

NCAA INITIAL ELIGIBILITY STANDARDS VIOLATE TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964.

In a case decided soon after the Supreme Court handed down the Smith decision, several African-American student-athletes alleged that they were unlawfully denied educational opportunities as freshman as a result of their ineligibility due to the NCAA's Proposition 16, specifically the minimum test score requirement. Therefore, the plaintiffs alleged that the NCAA rule violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.

Initially, the court held that even though a private right of action exists under Title VI, the plaintiffs still had to show that (1) the NCAA receives federal financial assistance and (2) that the minimum test score requirement has a disparate impact on African-American student-athletes. Cureton v. NCAA, 1998 WL 634376, * 2 (E.D. Pa 1997).

Both parties then filed motions for summary judgment which are the genesis of this case.

At first the court reiterated that the NCAA is covered by Title VI. It then moved to a discussion as to whether the NCAA receives federal financial assistance before subjecting the NCAA to Title VI. Id. at *4.

In answering this question the court looked to the plaintiff's argument that the NCAA indirectly receives federal financial assistance because the NCAA acts as the agent of its member institutions through its governance of intercollegiate athletics. In making its argument, the plaintiffs had relied on the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Smith, which was overturned as explained above. The plaintiffs also argued that the NCAA was itself a recipient of federal funds through the National Youth Sports Program. Id. at *4-5.

In answer to the plaintiff's reliance on Smith, the district court noted that as a result of the Supreme Court's decision, the plaintiffs could no longer rely on their argument based upon the relationship between the NCAA and its member schools even though it was clear that Title's VI and IX use similar language and regulations. Moreover, the court pointed out that "the regulations implementing Title VI are even more explicit than the Title IX regulations at issue in Smith in excluding 'any ultimate beneficiary' as a 'recipient' for Title VI purposes." Id. at *5. However, according to the court, the plaintiffs could still use this theory of argument in conjunction with other facts, to establish that the NCAA does receive federal funds and is therefore covered by Title VI.

The plaintiff student-athletes presented several theories to bring the NCAA under Title VI. In essence, the court agreed with two of the plaintiffs theories, (1) that the NCAA exercises control over the National Sports Youth Program and as a result controls the Community Services Block Grant which funds this enterprise, and (2) that member schools have ceded authority over their federally funded programs to the NCAA. Id. at * 5-6. As the court explained, member schools agree to abide by NCAA rules and to administer their athletic programs in accordance with these rules. The NCAA is then given regulatory and enforcement authority over these members who receive federal funds. Therefore, there is a sufficient "nexus between the NCAA's allegedly discriminatory conduct with regards to intercollegiate athletics and the sponsorship of such programs by federal fund recipients." Id. at 8.

The court next considered whether Proposition 16 resulted in an unjustified disparate impact as prohibited by Title VI. In establishing their case the plaintiffs pointed to several memos from the NCAA which clearly admitted that African-American students were disproportionately impacted by Proposition 16 in that higher percentages of these individuals could not meet NCAA initial eligibility requirements under Title VI, and that white student-athletes were excluded at lower percentages. Id. at * 9-12.

The NCAA responded by pointing to several potential benefits of Title VI including increases in graduation rates for African-American student-athletes, and increased numbers of such student-athletes receiving athletic scholarships relative to their composition in the student body. Id. at *11-12. The court responded that despite the potentially positive results, Title VI still comes into play if any individuals are disparately impacted. Accordingly, the court found that the plaintiffs had presented a prima facie case showing a racially disproportionate effect as a result of Proposition 16, in violation of Title VI. Id. at 13.

The analysis then shifted to the NCAA's justifications for Proposition 16 as an educational necessity. The NCAA presented two goals for this rule (1) raising graduation rates, and (2) closing the gap between black and white student-athlete graduation rates. Id at *14. Regarding the first goal, the court determined that the NCAA has "no legitimate interest in promulgating academic standards that affect the graduation rates of students in general," their scope should only be toward student-athletes. Id. Still, the court held that "the NCAA is properly setting academic standards for student-athletes in hopes of improving the rate at which they graduate." Id. at *16.

As to the second goal, the court found that this goal was both inappropriate and was not the true purpose behind Proposition 16 in the first instance. Id. at *17. Therefore, this clearly race based goal was not a legitimate goal for the NCAA to follow.

Consideration then moved to an assessment of the use of test scores as a means for achieving the legitimate goal of increasing graduation rates, even given the disparate impact. The court accepted that such standardized test scores have some relationship to predicting success at the college level. However, the problem centered on the NCAA's seemingly arbitrary use of a cutoff score in its sliding scale. (The scale compares a high school students GPA at graduation and matches it to a necessary standardized test score based on this sliding scale. The cutoff sets a minimum test score needed to be eligible). The court concluded that even though it would "not preclude the use of the SAT, or any particular cutoff score of the SAT, in the NCAA's adoption of an initial eligibility rule," here the NCAA had offered no evidence as to why the particular cutoff score was used. Id. at *24.

Finally, the court analyzed whether there were effective alternatives to Proposition 16 that the NCAA could have used, resulting in a lesser disparate impact. The court looked at three alternatives as presented by the plaintiffs and found that all three would project a less disparate impact on eligibility at the cost of slightly lower graduation rates. Id. at * 25-26.

Therefore, the plaintiff's motions were granted, the court declared that Proposition 16 was illegal under Title VI, and the NCAA was permanently enjoined from continued use and implementation of Proposition 16.

WEBFIND at http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/97-282.ZO.html & www.paed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/mfs/35/home/usdcedpa/public_html/opinions/99D0178P.HTM?16#mfs

 

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"You Make The Call..." is a newsletter published four times per year (spring, summer, fall, winter) by the National Sports Law Institute of Marquette University Law School, PO Box 1881, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 53201-1881. (414) 288-5815, fax (414) 288-5818, munsli@vms.csd.mu.edu. (www.marquette.edu/law/sports/call.html). This publication is distributed via fax and email to individuals in the sports field upon request.
Editorial Staff:
Paul M. Anderson, Editor & Designer
Kirsten Hauser, Associate Editor

 

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